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2 1.  Change dynamics 
Introduction 
Worldwide military spending has fallen from a peak of  over one trillion US dollars during the mid 1980s 
to approximately 675 billion in  1996, a reduction of roughly one·th ird. Although the rate of reduction 
has slowed down during recent years it still amounts to approximately three percent annually (BICC, 
1997 and 1998; see also Figure I). 
The scope of this global disarmament process is historical, comparable only to the adjustment after the 
end of  major wars. Considering, however, the magnitude of present day military budgets, the arms 
production capacities, the still existing stocks of  weapons-both conventional and weapons of mass 
destruction-and the size of  the armed forces in the world, one can argue that disarmament in the 19905 
falls short of  expectations. During the Cold War, war·like armed forces were maintained in many parts 
of  the world. But the end of the Cold War did bring  forces down to historic peace-time levels in only a 
few countries in the world. Large quantities of  scarce human and material resources are still invested in 
the military sector, resources which are badly required to improve development and human security. 
Obviously, earlier high expectations of  global disarmament were partly misplaced because the Cold War 
was only one, though dominant, cause for high levels of  armaments. True, a changed-generally more 
benign-security environment with the former East-West antagonisms which disappeared and decreased 
the priority of  defense spending enhanced by sharp budgetary constraints, resulted in cuts from which-
in contrast to previous times-the military has not been spared. But in a number of  countries, especially 
in Asia and the Middle East, military expenditures are increasing. Some of  the evidence, with the 
emphasis on arms transfers, is reviewed in the next section of  this paper. 
However, there are other breaks to further cuts in armed forces after the end of  the Cold War, which are, 
ifnot by necessity, though in practice, linked to its end. Dynamics are at work which already have begun 
to fundamentally affect the basis of  arms production and arms transfers and have the potential to 
severely change  military consumption patterns, in the industrialized countries as well as in developing 
countries. These dynamics are embedded in more general trends which are at the forefront of  global 
change at the turn of  the millennium: 
•  technological change: new and expanded uses of  electronics and computer sciences which are 
mostly developed in the civilian industry; allowing militaries an emphasis on real-time information 
and precision of  weapons instead of massive numerical military capabilities but necessitating the 
military to reorient towards dual-use technologies, effectively ending its overall claim of 
techno logica 1  supremacy 
3 •  econom ic change: commercia  I  izationand global ization-also in geograph ical terms-of  trade, 
consumption patterns and production in the civilian sector which puts into question the prior 
symbiotic relationship between nation states and national defense forces 
The quality and magnitude of  these changes already have been broad and are likely to be even more 
sweeping. Within the scope of  this paper, only some of  the issues can be dealt with, with a strong focus 
on the production of  and trade in weapons. The two sections of  this paper following a brief review of 
data on procurement of  and trade in arms, give a further outline of  the challenges for the current anns 
production and trade system and on the already noticeable extent of adaptation to those changes. 
However, much remains speculative. As one can also see from the data on armed forces, anns 
procurement and arms trade, dynamics are contradictory and do not provide for simple or clear-cut 
patten1S: 
•  Reductions in holdings can actually lead to  increasing fire-powerthrough the introduction of fewer, 
but more-deadly, new weapons, thus leading to pressures to develop new arms technologies 
•  Disarmamentreduces weapon holdings in those countries which disarm but makes additional 
'surplus' weapons available globally, leading to larger weapon holdings in recipient countries 
•  Reductions in procurement in arms producing countries puts pressure on  industries to increase 
exports and, thus, the level of  arms spending in recipient countries 
•  Oversupply of  weapons in the international market allows recipient countries to get better deals, 
which include offset arrangements where additional arms production capacity is built-up in recipient 
countries 
•  New military technology which is largely based on dual-use in technology may end the comparative 
advantages of  traditional national arms producers and lead to major relocation in the global arnlS 
production base 
•  Economic globalization erodes the decision-making  power and effective functioning of  states which 
are in turn the constitutive basis of  armed forces. 
This list could easily be extended. In orderto make at least a few of its elements more visible, the paper 
closes with three brief  case studies of particularly relevant issues. 
Figure I: Global decline of the defense market 
Push and  pull  factors of  military consumption 
One more issue shall be dealt with in this introduction, namely the question what factors influence the 
level and structure of  military consumption, specifically anns procurement and arms transfers. 
4 Obviously, both push and pull or supply and demand factors contribute to the arms procurement and 
transfer pattern. Recipients have various interests in  purchasing or receiving free-of-chargeweapons 
•  to be armed against external enemies 
•  to be armed against internal opponents 
•  to keep the military establishment content 
•  to use arms deals as a method to receive kick-backs 
•  to use weapons as a symbol of  power 
•  to use weapons as symbols of  a State's international relations, signaling where alliances and 
allegiances lie, etc. 
The importance of  demand factors can be  seen in the regional distribution of  weapons imports. Three 
regions-Europe, the Middle  East and Asia-have become the predominant centers of  demand for 
imported major conventional weapons. Among the importers of  major conventional weapons, ten 
recipients, all located in these three regions, namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Taiwan, Japan, China, 
Greece, South Korea, India and Germany (in the order of  the quantities of  their imports between 1992 
and 1996, see Figure 2) together accounted for over half  of  total deliveries (SIPRI, 1997). 
Typically, demand factors are closely linked to the internal, regional and international political situation 
of recipients. Individual combinations of  the above mentioned pull-factors can therefore only be 
analyzed case-by-case,a task beyond the scope of  this paper. 
Figure 2: The Top 10 Arms importers, 1992-1996 
The motivations of  suppliers makes the arms market quite distinct from that of  other commercial 
products such as automobiles, textiles or computers, where there are rarely any other motivations than 
money. Historically, weapons supplier motives have been broken down into economic and political 
motives. "In the former category arc business profits (or government 'profits'), employment, balance of 
payments, amortization of  research and development costs, and maintaininga warm base for cyclical 
arms industries dependent on high levels of  external threat. In the latter category are a plethora of  factors 
involving the cementing of  alliances, ties between military officers' corps, maintenance of regional 
balances of  power, base acquisitions, the forestallingof nuclear proliferation, political leverage or 
influence, and so on" (Harkavy, 1994, p.  15). With the end of  the East-West competition political 
motives have lost their top priority while at the same time, due to the shrinking market, the economic 
5 motives for arms exports have gained in  importance. Some discussion on  individual arms exporters is 
found in the following section. 
The interaction between pull and push factors has already been changed in the Post-Cold War era. For 
one, the combination of  cuts in  military expenditures and procurement budgets, reduced levels of  anns 
imports, the availabilityof surplus weapons which had been taken off  active duty and with anns 
producers seeking new markets, the arms market has become even more a  'buyers' market in which the 
few countries which had or made hard currency available for arms imports gained additional leverage 
(BICC, 1997). Secondly, the increased emphasis on the commercial side of arms transfers has meant that 
customers had to pay for weapons and could count less on free gifts, with the exception of 'surplus' 
weapons where supplier saw no chance of  selling. 
The combination of  overcapacity, oversupply and a more commercial approach to arms deliveries gives 
recipient countries more freedom to chose among various consumption patterns. Elements of  a three-
tiered arms transfer market have already developed: 
•  'light-weapon' armed forces predominantly importing and equipped with artillery, light vehicles, and 
small arms, as well as cheaply-acqu ired, but numerous, 'second-hand' major weapon systems 
•  'high-tech' armed forces, opting for the latest in technology of which, depending on resources made 
available, only very few items might be bought 
•  'home technology' armed forces, where the emphasis in procurement is on domesticallysupplied 
weapons, and thus, imports consist mostly of  components and foreign technology instead of  complete 
weapon systems. 
In practice, armed forces of  individual countries may mix these approaches, for instance have a high-
tech airforce and a light-weapon anny. 
The choice among these consumption patterns, however, remains lim ited even in the post-Cold War era, 
despite a 'buyers' market, by available resources, conflict patterns and the patterns of military 
procurement behavior. Countries may not be able or willing, to have more than a 'light weapon army'. It 
makes little sense to buy very modern weapons for an army that has little manpower to  use such 
weaponry. Therefore, only a few, generally resource-rich, countries in the Middle East and Asia are 
effectively building up high-tech annies. 
6 · Light-weapon' armed forces are probably best equipped against enem ies that are even less well anncd 
which is regularly the case in  internal conflicts, the dam inating type of  conflict in the post-Cold War era. 
On the other hand, once high-tech weapons are introduced in a region. the other armed forces who want 
to compete may also have to get slich weapons. Action-reaction patterns are very pronounced in  mil itary 
procurement. This is partly due to the fact that even on Iy slightly better weapon systems may give 
crucial advantage, consider, for instance, the range of  air-to-air missiles. Partly, however, it is also due to 
the  military perception that overall military capabilities best be measured by looking at the most 
advanced weapons in arsenals. 
In general, military consumption patterns have been very international for a long time. A number of 
authors demonstrated already in the 1970s that structures, organizations,and self-perceptions of  anned 
forces were very similar(with some exceptionsat the time, such as China, Switzerland and Yugoslavia), 
and that this also exerted pressures on uniformity of  doctrines and procurement patterns (Kaldor/Eide, 
1979). Important transformation measureS of international patterns included training in  foreign 
countries, but also the mechanisms of  international marketing of  arms. A hierarchy in the  development 
of  norms of military behavior was detected, with the United States at the top, closely followed by the 
Soviet Union, the industrialized countries in the next tier, followed by some of  the newly industrializing 
countries. 
With the end of  the Cold War, specifically the end of  the Soviet Union and other dynamics discussed 
above, such as the build-up of  domestic arms production in a number of  countries in Asia, this hierarchy 
is challenged but not overthrown. The United States continues to be at the top, both in terms of 
technology and resources devoted to arms production. It therefore has a high degree of  power over what 
the arms transfer system of  the next century will look like. I f globalization of  arms production increases, 
the trade in arms may become even more commercial ultimately ending up like the trade of  all other 
goods. However, suppliers, if  they could unite, also have the option to make it a highly restrictive system 
where the trade in arms and in technology to make arms is  considered exceptional. Individual suppliers 
could also try to defy recent dynamics and attempt to return to a power-oriented system where arms are 
given to friends but not to adversaries. Of  course, a hybrid system combining certain of  these features is 
distinctly possible. 
What becomes clear from this brief  discussion is that while recipients seem to have a greater amount of 
choice over their military consumption patterns than they had in the past, in fact they are still rather 
7 restricted unless they opt out of a system the  structure of  which remains to be dom inated from the 
central weapon supplier. The following sections of  this paper therefore concentrate on supply factors and 
present major trends which have contributed to changed consumption patterns in the military sector. 
2.  Development of  arms procurement  and arms trade 
Procurementexpenditure 
The general global trend of  disarmament was also reflected in expenditure cuts for purchasing weapons. 
NATO spending on equipment was down to US $81  billion in  1996 from a level of US $120 billion in 
1987 (see Figure I). Within the NA  TO alliance reductions were not equally distributed. Cuts were most 
pronounced in some of  the major producing countries, such as the United States, Germany and the 
United Kingdom, while several countries with relatively small procurement budgets increased their 
spending during the last decade, e.g. Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal and Turkey. 
Reductions in procurement expenditure in other countries were even more noticeable. Russia's 
procurement expenditure is no comparison to the times of  the Soviet Union. Due to its dire overall 
economic performance, only small numbers of new equipment are being ordered these days despite the 
fact that the armed forces and their equipment are  in a dreadful state. In  1996 the domestic defense 
procurement contracts amounted to a level of  4.6 percent of  the 1991  level, according to Alexander 
Eliseev of  the Committee on Conversion and Science-intensive  Technologies of  the State Duma 
(Krasnaya zvezda, 26 April 1997, p. 4). Other successor states of  the Soviet Union (such as the  Ukraine 
and Belarus) are in a similar situation. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe-including those which 
are likely to become NATO members soon-all reduced their overall military expenditure in real terms 
during the 1990s, primarily for economic reasons. In addition, spending on procurement of  arms has 
declined over-proportionally,mainly due to an increasing share of personnel cost. Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania increased their share of  personnel cost within a Shrinking 
military budget, mainly at the cost of  procurement between 1990 and 1996 (SIPRI, 1997, p.  180). 
Whetherthis trend is reversed with the expansion of  NATO remains to be seen. 
Consequences/or  production 
As a result-and despite a substantial downsizing of  the defense industry-a large share of  the capacity 
to produce weapons remains idle. Precise figures on actual capacity utilization in the defense industry 
are difficult to ascertain and variations from country to country and company to company exist. Despite 
recent mergers and acquisitions, statistics show that capacity utilization for the average US defense 
electronics company is still less than 30 percent, as a recently completed study of more than 35  US 
defense electronics manufacturers underlines (Dowdy, 1997). In Russia capacity utilization amounts to 
8 only 10 to 13  percent (Segodllya,  19 February 1997). These idle capacities, unless closed down or 
converted for non-m ilitary purposes, will exert a constant pressure and accelerate lobbying activities for 
add itionalm i  I  itary procurement beyond security-based rational. 
While the global trend has shown  a clear downturn in procurement expenditure, several countries, 
especially in  the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East have invested strongly in  new equipment. At 
the same time, some of  these countries (such as Australia, Ch ina, I  nd ia, I  ndonesia,Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Taiwan) have domestic arms production facilities at their disposal and are partly 
building up new facilities or expanding them. The aggregate global figures of reduced military or 
procurement expenditures obscure the fact that for anum  ber of  countries the dec I  ine has even been more 
pronounced. 
I  n add ition to the reduction of  procurement expend  iture in real terms, productiv ity ga ins in arms 
production have to be taken into consideration to arrive at a realistic estimate of  the restructuringof the 
supply side. Assuming an annual three percent productivity increase in defense companies (a 
conservative estimate for the major producers in the United States and Western Europe), the same 
volume of  arms can be produced today with a 25 percent lower input of  resources than a decade ago. In 
wanting to remain a serious competitor in arms production on the world market, Russia will probably 
have no choice but to improve productivity in the defense industry. On a global average, the defense 
industry had to cope with reductions of military expenditures of  one-third while additionally requiring 
one-quarter fewer inputs per unit of  output (BICC, 1998). 
G/oha/arms exports: On the rise again? 
The trade in major conventional weapons was halved between 1987 and 1992. It leveled offat 
approximately US $23 billion (in prices of 1990) for a period offour years (SIPRI, 1997). Other sources, 
based on differing definitions of  the arms trade also reported strong declines (see Figure 3). The 
reductions in arms trade were not evenly distributed among the major arms exporters. Shifts in the 
market occurred, especially at the expense of producers from Central and Eastern Europe. From the 
position of  the erstwhile number one arms exporter, the USSR, Russia shrank to a medium size exporter 
and has only in recent years recovered larger shares in the generally stagnant market. West European 
producers lost business as well, while United States' companies dominate the arms export market. 
Was  the decade-long trend of  decline in arms transfers reversed in the second half  of  the 1990s? Is this 
the first signal of  a general change in the trend of  global arms production? Some newspaper reports in 
1996 and 1997 claimed as much. They were based on newly published data on arms exports from the US 
Congressional Research Service (Grimmett, 1996) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(!ISS, 1996 and 1997) indicatinga rise in the value of  weapon deliveries. From about the mid-1980s, 
delivery values of  weapons declined dramatically. Between 1994 and 1995 they were estimated to have 
9 risen by  16 percent (Grimmett, 1997, Table 2A), 20 percent (ACDA 1997, p.  100) and 2 percent (llSS, 
1996, p. 274; see also Figure 2). While the IISS records another increase for 1996 (IISS 1997), the 
Congressional Research Service reports a small decrease for 1996 (Grimmett, 1997. p.  5). 
There are two major independent sources, a data series on deliveries of major weapons by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute(S[PR[, 1997) and a data set maintained by the US government 
from which selections are published by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA, [997) 
and the US Congressional Research Service (Grimmett, 1997). The llSS also publishes data on global 
arms exports that are partly based on the US government data, as taken from ACDA and CRS, and partly 
own estimates. 
S[PRI data for major weapons show a stagnation of  exports (actua[ deliveries) in the mid-[990sat a 
level of  about one half  of  the value of  exports of  the mid-1980s. ACDA and CRS data on deliveries 
show an even larger depression of  the arms market. M id-1990 figures are less than one third of the [evel 
of  the mid-[980s. Major reasons for this difference are the much higher valuation of  Soviet arms exports 
in the US government data base and a higher valuation of used weapons in the SIPR[ data base. As 
Soviet arms trade declined and the trade in surplus weapons increased, the gap between US government 
and SIPRI data (which covers only the major weapon part of  the arms trade) narrowed considerably. 
All sources concur that from about 1992, global arms delivery values have been fairly stable. However, 
the global trend is composed of  quite different developments in different regions. East Asia and, at least 
in the US government data, the Middle East is  increasing arms imports while delivery values to 
European, Latin American and African countries are continuing to decrease. The increase in the figure 
for 1995 reported by llSS and CRS reflect deliveries of  expensive weapons to the Middle Eastern states 
that were ordered in the wake of  the Gulf War of [990/91. 
The US government data base also allows a glimpse into the future since it records order values of  arms 
deals as well as delivery values. The CRS report shows a declining trend similar to the trend for delivery 
values, except for a 'Gulf  War bump' in  1993. Since then, the value of  agreements has continued to 
decline, with a small increase again in  1996 (Grimmett, 1997, Chart I). This leads to the conclusion that 
delivery values have  stabilized again at a lower level, since the backlog from the 'Gulf  War bump' has 
been worked down. 
All in all, export data do not provide a clear picture of the mid-1990s yet, though it is likely that the 
descent of  the late 1980s and early 1990s has slowed down. However, considering the continuing 
decline in military expenditures and domestic procurement, that trend can provide little re[iefto the 
economic problems of  the defense industry which  still has not cut all those overcapacities that were 
built-up during the height of  the Cold War in the 1980s. 
10 Figu re 3: Global arms trade. 1988-1996 
3.  Technological changes 
Technologicalchange influences the defense market and military consumption patterns. Weapons 
development and modern warfare have become science-and technology-dependent,a fact demonstrated 
to television watchers live during the 1991  Gulf War by the accuracy of  air-delivered weapons into Iraq. 
Two broad trends in technology evolution have influenced and shaped military planning and weapons 
development: First, dual-use, a term which describes the interrelation between technologies in the 
military and the commercial sector. Spin-off for commercial use and-vice versa-the spin-in or spin-
on of commercially developed technologies for military purposes can be of  importance for both sectors. 
Second, the development of new and revolutionizingtechnologieswhich have led to increasing capital 
investments, an amassment of  conventional weapon systems and to a lessened emphasis on manpower. 
DUlIl-use technologies 
The term dual-use technology refers to technology that has both military and non-militaryapplication. 
Most technologies are, in fact, multi-purpose and are not specifically designed for only one use. The 
literature on dual-use technologies in the world of  defense and commerce has produced contradictory 
opinion on the scope and policy implicationsof  dual-use. Defense industry representativesofien 
underline the usefulness of  spin-off  of  technologies from earlier military applications. The counter 
argument emphasizes that the defense industry has not been able to spin-offas many commercial 
technologies as the proponents suggest. There were certainly important technological developments 
initiated or sparked by defense efforts. The Atomic bomb was the harbinger of  the new era of  science-
dependent weapon development with direct implications for the energy supply in many countries. In the 
sector of nuclear, information or materials technology the pacemaker role of  defense technology is 
recognized. However, a systematic link of  spin-off  into the commercial sector is lacking (Gummett and 
Reppy, 1988) and excessive defense sponsorship of  research skews the direction of  scientific research 
and might divert vital resources away from the civilian economy (Melman, 1974; Dumas, 1986). A 
former US Departmentof Defense official, Lawrence Korb, graphically made the point: "It was clear the 
civilian sector had use for the 707, but who wants a Stealth Bomber other than the military?" (Financial 
Times,  18 August 1997). The interrelationship between the military and the commercial sector is not 
characterized by a smooth and harmonious transfer of  technologies. On the contrar/"  high barriers, 
created by institutional differences and incompatible business practices, separate these sectors 
(Markusen, 1992). 
There is another element of  the dual-use debate which, for at least some countries, is potentially the 
most important future path: the integration of  civilian technologies into modern weapon systems. There 
II is agreement on  the general trend of  an  increasing dependence of  weapons development on commercial 
technology(Alic et aI., 1992, p.  7; Gansler, 1997). Military technology, once considered the pacemaker 
to technological innovation, is falling behind its civilian counterpart in  many areas. A defense-driven 
technology strategy as implied in the spin-off  paradigm is becom ing less and less relevant in the 
contemporary world (Alic et aI.,  1992). 
An often quoted piece of  empirical evidence is the development of information technology. In the early 
stages, information technology and the computer industry benefited and in  many areas depended on 
research grants, subsidies and orders of  the Defense Department of  the United States. This situation has 
changed completely. As a general rule, software, computers or other information technologies are no 
longer designed and developed according to mil itary specifications and with the resources allocated 
from the military budget. On the contrary, many civilian high-tech components and systems perfoml 
equally well or better than mil itary ones and weapon developers can often rely on technology freely 
available on the commercial market and can (and should, for econom ic reasons) buy off-the-shelf 
(Gansler, 1995). This is a result of  an enormously growing commercial market, especially when 
compared to stagnant and lately reduced military R&D budgets and the rapid pace of  technological 
development of  this market. Similar shifts in technology generation can be observed in other sectors, 
such as materials and propulsion. 
Still, civilian technologies and off-the-shelfcomponentsare increasingly used in weapon systems. This 
practice is likely to increase, especially if predictions for a more frequent  use of  electronics in warfare 
become reality (see below). 
Future military technologies 
The general procurement pattern of  the armed forces in the world is characterized, on the one hand, by 
the desire to deploy state-of-the-art  equipment and, on the other hand, by the limited financial and 
human resources available to operate such systems. As a result, most armed forces in the world have 
weapons in their inventory which are not necessarily based on the latest but on yesterdays technology; at 
times, the equipment is of  Korean War vintage. Furthermore, in the wars which are presently being 
fought in the world, the most used weapons are low-tech small arms rather than sophisticated big-ticket-
items. Despite these facts and notwithstanding resource constraints, technology developments have a 
significant influence on weapon developments and procurement patterns. In the country that spearheads 
the development of  modern military technology, the United States, there seems to be little doubt that 
warfare in the early 21 st century will be dramatically  different from that of  the past. The changes in 
military technology are so fundamental that US experts do not hesitate to speak of  a 'revolution in 
military affairs (RMA)' (Bracken and Alcala, 1994,  Odom, 1993, Gansler, 1997).ln the Gulf War some 
of  this new technology was used and tested; this experience actually added momentum to the general 
12 trend of  emphasizing the importance of  comlllunication, computing, electronics, precision guidance, 
reconnaissance and other modern technologies. It is  likely that the importance of  technology to weapons 
development and mi litary planning will increase even further. 
Jacques Gansler. who in the summer of 1997 was nominated Under Secretary of Defense for 
Procurement and thus responsible for procurement in the US Department of Defense. in a recent study 
defined six broad characteristics which will be required for the next generation of  weapon systems and 
which will therefore drive the direction of future technology development: 
I.  Low cost: Financial constraints make it absolutely essential to reverse the historic trend of  ever 
increasing cost of  weapons from one generation to the next. 
2.  Short Cycles: Recognizingthe speed of  technology development in commercial sectors. the general 
practice in weapon development of  spending 10 to 20 years on design, development and testing and 
then assuming the system will be deployed for the next few decades is simply no longer valid. 
3.  Modern logistics: Military forces have to change from a "just-in-case" philosophy to a "just-in-time" 
logistics system. 
4.  Large firepower with small forces: Smaller forces will be lighter. but will have the capability to draw 
on precise intelligence information and will have the ability to call on, or deliver, precision strike 
capability. 
5.  Continuous operations: While conflicts will be short in duration, armed forces will operate on a 24-
hour, all-weather basis. 
6.  Simulation-based planning and training: The extensive use of  advanced computer modeling and 
simulation will improve military effectiveness and reduce costs (Gansler, 1997). 
A whole range of  new technologies are offered for the next generations of  weapons and for military 
operations. Developmentand application of  advanced technology, such as lightweight materials, 
reconnaissance equipment, sensors, information technology, precision guidance, stealthy designs and 
materials, directed energy technology etc., will spearhead weapon development. 
Whether such far-reaching transformations are going to be implemented or remain partly or largely 
utopian or whether they will be feasible only to the technologically most advanced and economically 
richest countries is an open question. Some of  these prescriptions for modernizing the armed forces 
seem to be close to realization, others seem far-fetched. Whether the large and bureaucratic 
organizations of  the armed forces can actually reform to the extent suggested or whether they will 
largely hold on to past practices instead and defend their traditional turf remains to be seen. In all these 
areas of  technology developmentthere is clearly a trade-off  between cost and performance. Not all the 
13 equ  i pment wh ieh might be attract ive to mil itary planners is  affordable~and some of the advantages 
wh ich future modern mil i  tary techno logy might offer wi II  be wiped out by counter-measures. 
Furthermore, with an im proving security env ironment, voluntary (un i  lateral or multi-laterally 
negotiated) renunc iat ion of  some of  the technologies might be possible. A Ithough, the history of 
restraining the  integration of  new technologies into weapons or putting a cap on  military R&D 
expenditures with a view of preventing a technology oriented arms race has not been very successful, it 
does not mean that in today's world advance in this direction is impossible. 
The general direction of  development is probably to reduce the role and number of persons in the anned 
forces and to increase the importance of  capital and technology. Industrialized countries prioritize capital 
investment, technology development and military hardware while the armed forces in developing 
countries are personnel intensive. This is also reflected in the expenditure per soldier in the armed forces 
of  the different regions of  the world which fluctuate from approximately US $6,200 per year in CIS 
countries and US $7,000 in Africa and South Asia to US $93,400 in NATO countries. 
Figure 4: The rising capital cost of armed forces 
The trends of modernizing technology and integrating them into weapon systems are likely to result in 
new (not necessarily additional but alternative  )consumption patterns of  the military. A shift in demand 
away from traditional weapon platforms towards electronics and other modern technologies will benefit 
some sectors and companies at the expense of  others. The country in which such a trend is  likely to be 
most pronounced will be the United States. A further intensification of US dominance in modern 
technology is probable. It seems also possible that the linkage between civilian and military technology 
will grow stronger as more civilian technology is being used in weapon systems. 
4.  Pressures to internationalize versus national orientation 
Different economic indicators signal that the economy has become more globalized in recent years. 
Although the term'  globalization' is defined differently and has emerged as a catchword for a variety of 
different econorn ic developments it seems to indicate the internationalizationof markets. Large 
companies  operate~both in their resource input of  capital, technology, know how and labor as well as 
in their marketing strategies-on a global scale. More and more products are produced on the basis of 
inputs from various countries and are designed for and sold on the global market place. Not all branches 
of industry have globalized to the same extent at the same time. Labor intensive branches, such as 
textiles and shoes, were among the first, followed by capital intensive branches, like automobiles, 
machinery, chemical products. Technology intensive branches, such as  electronics and 
telecommunication, intensified their international activities in the 1980s while the dom inating 
'globalizers' of  the 1990s are within the finance, service and media sector (Stopford and Strange, 1991). 
14 In contrast to anum  ber of industrial branches which  are increasingly operating on a global level, the 
defense industry is less affected and remains determinedly nationally oriented. This is favored by 
governments who continue to assist and subsidize their national champions in defense production. 
Capital investments or takeovers by foreign companies are often banned and home markets are protected 
against competitive imports. Most of  the weapons are produced for the domestic market and 
international competition is largely confined to those countries which have none or only limited anns 
development and production facilities. Pork-barrel pol itics which foster local commercial and labor 
interest reinforce the resistance against broad-based internationalizationofthe defense industry. 
Neither the broad international debate on disarmament to make the world and its people (not a particular 
nation) safer nor multilateral military action (such as  expanded and intensified United Nations peace 
keeping operations) have altered the principal national outlook of  defense procurement and defense 
production. The industry has purposely or by default spent the last years transform ing itself, however, 
without the same globalization of its base as occurred in other industrial branches. The transfonnation 
process is probably most advanced in the United States while the pace of  consolidation in  Europe (East 
and West) and in some developing countries like China, South Africa, India and Pakistan is still lagging 
behind. 
Internationalizationof  anns production is, even in a period of  rapid 'globalization'  ,full of 
contradictions. Both fostering and inhibiting trends influence this process. 
The pressure to internationalize 
The technological developments described above result in an  inflation of  development costs, a process 
which is imposed by the monopsonistic buyer of  weapons while the size of  the market is constrained by 
fiscal considerations. This creates a chronic tendency for military production to occur at levels that are 
too low to achieve unit cost savings and, as technological needs expand, a tendency for unit costs to 
grow. Since production levels are low from an economic perspective and production runs short, this 
means that there is chronic excess capacity in military production. In contrast to modern civil high-
technologies where markets continue to grow substantially, technological development in the military 
becomes a vicious circle. Thus, there is a strong pressure to seek new markets outside the narrow 
domestic procurement of weapons. 
Furthermore, the trend towards integrating dual-use technology is also a driving force of 
internationalization.Since commercial technologies in many sectors are developed by globally operating 
companies, defense producers cannot only buy domestically. The incentives for global sourcing of 
components and subsystems are growing. At the same time, these activities are slowed down by 
strategies of  national independence in defense technology. 
15 In addition, importing countries often insist on  license production or other forms of  collaboration in 
production (like assembly, subcontracting or oft~set agreements). This trend (described below) also 
forces companies to set up new production facilities despite the drive of  many defense companies to 
downsize and consolidate. 
I  nfernafiollal  arms producing companies 
Most defense companies-in contrast to such global players as Coca-Cola, IBM, M itsubishi, Shell and 
Siemens, to name just few companies of  the commercial world-are still based in a single country and 
many of  the defense companies have no or only limited productions outside the country of  origin. Often, 
arms production abroad is lim ited to collaboration in production because importing countries insist on 
such collaboration. This type of  activity mainly aims at targeting export markets and is (so far) not 
driven by the strategies of global sourcing and global production. This, however, might change in future. 
Upon merging with McDonnell Douglas, Boeing's defense and space division chairman declared: '"We 
want to be more like Shell or Coca-Cola. Wherever you are you must be a local company" (Grant, 1997, 
p.8) 
At present, defense companies' share of  exports in total turnover often remains small. Lockheed Martin, 
the world's largest defense company in  1996 and one of  the most international of  the United States' 
defense companies, exported but 18 percent of its production and only 6,000 of  its 190,000 employees 
worked outside the United States. Similarly, only 10,000 of Raytheon's 127,000 staff  are located 
overseas. Due to its small domestic market, some European companies have a somewhat different 
record; British Aerospace, for example, the largest European defense company, exports 87 percent of  its 
sales overseas. But here again, only 9,000 of  43,000 employees are  based outside the United Kingdom 
(all figures taken from Grant, 1997). Two of  the true multinational arms producing companies in the 
1970s and 1980s in  Western Europe, Philips and Oerlikon-Blihrle,proved to weak to compete in the 
I 990s and left the defense sector completely (Philips) or reduced its defense dependence (Oerlikon-
BUhrle). 
Companies in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia play, so far, a marginal role in this contradictory 
but emerging internationalizationprocess. The pain of  downsizing and closure of  companies in the 
former Eastern bloc has even translated into a gain for companies in the West as they have been able to 
take hold in some of  the traditional arms markets of  the former Soviet Union. 
These statistics, although not comprehensive, demonstrate that the defense industry remains a special 
case and is far from a globalized industrial branch. In most countries the domestic market still plays the 
primary role, nonetheless, international business is of  growing importance. While nascent trends of 
internationalization  can be observed in the defense sector, large-scale or systematic globalization has 
certainly not emerged yet. 
16 Arms export!)' as an indicator 
The internationa I trade in  armaments is the most visible measure of  global ization in the mil itary sector 
(United Nations, 1997). Arms sales declined more rapidly than military expenditures in the first half  of 
the 1990s, with the ratio of  arms exports to global military expenditures, dropping from 6.1  percent in 
1987 to 4.6 percent in  1995, after hitting a low of3.0 percent in  1992 and  1994. Similar 'southwards' 
trends can be observed by using other sources (SIPRI, 1997). By way of comparison, global 
merchandise exports rose from  11.8 percent of  world GDP in  1987 to 15.8 percent in  1995. As a 
consequence the share of  arms exports in global merchandise exports decreased from 2.7 percent in  1985 
to 0.7 percent in  1995 (ACDA, 1997, p.  100). 
Figure 5: Share of  arms exports in  military expenditures 
The concentration of  the arms trade on a few major exporters also points in the same direction. This 
trade has always taken place  within a highly concentrated group of  states. Figure 6 (based on SIPRI 
statistics) indicates that the 6 largest suppliers (USA, USSR/Russia, Germany, UK, France and China), 
observed aCross the period, supplied close to or over 90 percent of  all major conventional weapons 
traded. This trend, however, is , somewhat contradicted by the fact that more and more second-hand or 
surplus arms have been delivered in recent years which are available from a whole range of  countries 
and not only from the traditional arms producing countries (see for case study on surplus weapons 
below). 
Other than the major suppliers-such as the Netherlands, Canada, Israel, Italy, the Czech Republic and 
some of  the successor states of  the former Soviet Union-account for small shares but seem to be 
increasing their importance as arms suppliers. 
Figu re 6:  Percentage of  arms exports of  the major suppliers 
The available data on arms trade thus does not support the hypothesis that there is growing and 
systematic internationalization in the global arms market. For some defense industries, such as the 
Russian, the share of  exports in total production has grown, while for others, such as the French, it has 
declined. However, the decline in military exports may conceal that a more direct internationalizationof 
production has supplanted trade in complete (end-product) weapon systems. The trade may have shifted 
from complete weapon systems to components and technology. 
17 5.  Three case studies: Supplier  policies, demand driven countertrade and 
surplus weapons 
A new round of  fighter aircraft arms fIIce in Soul" America? 
For almost 20 years until the mid-1990s, air forces in  Latin America have procured few modern fighter 
aircraft. They made do with the upgrade of  models purchased in the I 970s, the importation of  small 
numbers of used aircraft or with simpler fighter aircraft, such as the joint BraziIian-ItalianAMX fighter. 
Argentina's armed forces imported a few modern French Etendard bomber aircraft before the South 
Atlantic war of 1982; a larger order was later canceled by the democratic government. The Peruvian 
government of Belaunde Terry ordered French Mirage fighter aircraft in  1982; the newly elected 
government of  Alan Garcia tried to cancel the order in  1984 but was rebuffed by the French government 
who insisted on delivery. 
The major reason for such restraint was probably economic. Economic growth was low, governments 
were under pressure to reduce deficits. In addition, democratic governments who  began to replace 
military dictatorships in the early 1980s introduced tougher civilian control over the armed forces and 
their expenditures. Finally, leaders in Latin America got together several times with the goal to jointly 
limit weapons procurement. In  1984, for instance, at the initiative of the then-President of Peru, Alan 
Garcia, Presidents from a number of  South American countries signed the Ayacucho Declaration calling 
for restraint in arms purchases. 
The restraint was supported from the outside. Specifically, US governments had  had a policy, 
introduced in  1978 by then-US Presidentlimmy Carter, not to introduce new weapons into the region 
and to exercise a policy of  restraint with the presumption of  denial. This policy was continued by the 
Reagan administration, with one exception, the delivery of  F- I 6s to Venezuela Uustified as a measure 
against Cuban armaments}. 
The economic situation of  many South American countries has improved in the 1990s. However, a 
number of  earlier security threats have also subsided. Democraticallyelected governments in Argentina 
and Brazil have buried their traditional rivalry; the relations between Chile and Argentina have 
improved, as have those between Brazil and its Northern neighbors. The one major remaining conflict is 
between Peru and Ecuador. 
Even in the absence of  specific arms control agreements, the demand for imported modern fighter 
aircraft in  South America has remained small, arguably including the cases of Peru and Ecuador. As was 
widely reported, the Air Force of  Ecuador purchased 4 Israeli Kfir fighter aircraft in  1995. The Peruvian 
government responded by importing 12 used M  iO-29 aircraft from Belarus. However, neither of these 
18 purchases can be regarded as a major improvement of  military capabilities. The Kfir is a copy of  a 
I 960s-vintage French Mirage aircrati, while the MiG-29s reportedly are in poor condition. 
Judging by the level of  tensions, South American countries, including Peru and Ecuador. have fared well 
with restraint in the purchase of modern fighter aircraft. The clashes between these two countries 
remained limited with comparatively low numbers of victims. With more capable bomber and fighting 
airerati, the contlicts might easily have escalated. 
However, the situation is  in danger of  changing before the turn of  the century and it seems that the 
armed forces are in the process of  being tempted into changing their past procurement pattern. The air 
forces in all the larger countries in South America have been the target of marketing drives by 
companies selling modern fighter aircraft. Reportedly, it was quietly arranged that Brazilian Air Force 
generals could fly F-16 aircraft produced by Lockheed Martin in  Puerto Rico (Waller, 1997). A more 
impressive array of military planes than ever was displayed at the bi-annual Chilean air show. FI DAE, in 
1997, including the B-2 Stealth bomber and F-16s. South America had long been seen as minor market 
by the large arms corporation producing expensive aircraft. The former United States Assistant 
Secretary of  State, Alexander Watson, reported that until early 1996 "nobody in Latin America showed 
any interest in buying these jets" (Waller, 1997). However, with declining sales at home and in foreign 
markets, interest in selling there increased again. Traditional market analysis showed that these countries 
ought to  buy since they had not bought modern fighter aircraft in such a long time. Lockheed Martin 
reportedly found that Latin America was a "growing market with unlimited potentia!." Manufacturers 
estimate that South America holds up to $7 billion in future aircraft orders (Arms Sales Monitor, No. 25, 
6 August 1997). 
There remained, at least for companies from the United States, the obstacle of  the earlier restraint policy. 
However, industry had little difficulty in  enlisting the support of  the Defense Department and a number 
of law-makers in  Washington as supporters for a change in policy. Main arguments were that with 
democratic governments throughout the region, the original reason for sanctions had disappeared. Also, 
they argued, that other suppliers were snatching up the business US corporations were not allowed to do. 
The State Department and a group of  members of  Congress long opposed a change, arguing that restraint 
had served the interests both of  the United States and the countries concerned. There are numerous 
reports about what tipped the scales, a report in Time Magazine detailing the large financial 
contributions of  defense-related companies during the 1996 election campaign (Waller, 1997), other 
reports linking it to a change of  mind in the State Department (Meyers, 1997). On I August 1997, the 
Clinton administration introduced a new policy announcing that it would consider arms sales to South 
American armed forces 'case by case.' 
19 The Chilean Air Force did lobby the governmentto purchase modern fighter aircraft and in early 
1996the government launched a procurement process. The governments of both Argentina and Brazil 
have said that they prefer not to raise the technological level of  their Air Forces, however, that they 
might have to follow suite if  Chile bought modern fighter aircraft. Air Force officials in  both countries 
have claimed that new fighter aircraft are needed. 
Until the summer of 1997, it seemed at least to be an open question whether air forces in the 'Cono Sur' 
would buy modern new fighter aircraft. In a way it was a typical strategic game problem: as long as no 
country bought such weapons, no other country would do so. Once one purchase was made, though, the 
others would follow. It is to fear that this change in US policy has made it more likely that such a train of 
purchases will be set in motion. 
Offsets: A prerequisite to stay in the market? 
Offsets have become a central feature, even a prerequisite in shaping the financing of  the global arms 
trade. Offsets can take the form of  countertrade and involve an arms supplying company agreeing to 
arrange the purchase of  goods and services from the buying country as full or partial repayment, or they 
can take the form of  transfers ofknow-how, licenses and production technology from the purchasing 
country to enable the lalterto set up production lines of  its own. While offsets are a phenomenon which 
attracted the attention of  experts already more than a decade ago (Neuman, 1985), it seems that offsets 
are increasingly demanded by weapon importing countries (GAO, 1996). Apparently, this new trend is 
demand driven and consent to offset demands is a sign of  competitive pressures. Offsets that enable 
purchasing countries to set up domestic arms production lines have additional effects: they contribute 
further to global overcapacity in arms production (see above). They also contribute to the globalization 
of  arms production, at least initially, when domestic arms production is highly dependent upon foreign 
inputs. Especially in East Asia, the link between offsets and the build-up of  a domestic arms industry has 
been close (Willett, 1997) 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade prohibits the practice of  offsets in government 
procurement, except for procurement of military weapons. Thus, offsets are a specific, often practiced 
characteristic of the arms trade. As the world's largest arms producer and largest exporter of  weapons, 
the United States is at the center of  this trend of increasing offsets development, but this trend is not 
restricted to the United States. Western and East European companies, Russian arms producers as well 
as companies from developing countries use offset strategies increasingly as an instrument of 
competition to operate in established markets or to open up new ones. 
A study by the Bureau of  Export Administration of  the US Department of  Commerce (BXA, 1996) 
concludes that the average level of  offsets in  US defense trade was 57 percent. Interestingly,offsets 
involving West European companies (as recipients of  US weapons) now approach 100 percent of  the 
20 value of  contracts with occasional offsets of  over 100 percent. I  n the case of  Swedish imports from the 
US between 1980 and 1987, US companies agreed to 173.8 percent of  offset obligations, in the case of 
Spain to 132.5 percent (BXA, 1996, p.  14). 
Countries with developed econom ies, practically all West European countries which import anns, 
usually encourage offsets directly related to the specific arms deal agreed upon. Agreements typically 
involve license production, coproduction activities or subcontractor arrangements of  the weapon system 
that is acquired. (See Figure 7). 
Industrial izingcountries, especially the newly industrializingcountries in Asia with developing defense 
and commercial industries such as South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, but also countries 
with a tradition in arms production like India and China have pursued both defense-related(direct) and 
non-defense-related(indirect)offsets. The typical arrangement in the past between India and the Soviet 
Union (partly also today with Russia) involved the supply of  tea and industrial products (such as railway 
carriages) by India to pay for defense production technology. The agreements with new industrializing 
countries emphasize work in the defense and aerospace industry. The aim of  the importing countries 
usually is to import production and maintenance know how rather than the finished product. 
Especially less industrialized countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
which are large arms importing countries, generally pursue indirect offsets to help create profitable 
business and build their country's infrastructure. These countries usually do not enter direct (weapon 
related) offsets because they have no or only limited advanced technology infrastructures which could 
attract contract work from foreign arms producers. 
Figure 7: Typologyof  offsets in arms trade (sample of  ofT  sets) 
The cost and benefits of  offsets in arms trade are a debated issue. The possible adverse impact on 
employment in the supplier country of  offsets, the industrial and technology base (transfer of know how) 
are weighed against the benefits of increased export levels in a competitive buyers' market and 
additional sales of  spare parts and services overthe life time of  the exported weapon system. The most 
important result of  offsets in the global arms market probably is the expansion of  an already excessive 
arms production, repair and maintenance capacity. Defense offsets are likely to create or enhance 
competitors in a generally tight and competitive market. 
Trading surplus weapons: A negative by-producto!  disarmament 
While international trade in newly produced weapons declined substantially after the end of  the Cold 
War, statistics on surplus of  second-hand weapons trade indicated record levels. A combination of  push 
and pull factors has influenced the transfer of  surplus. As disarmamenttreaties and cease-fires in 
different parts of  the world were implemented and armed forces reduced the number of  deployed 
21 weapons due to budget cuts, inventories of  surplus weapons accumulated to as many as  165,000 pieces 
of major weapons world-wide. This has had a strong impact on the consumption pattern of  the amled 
forces. More than 18,000 of  these surplus weapons were exported or given away internationally between 
1990 and 1995. For the first time in  1994, the trade of  surplus weapons was larger than the trade in new 
weapons (BICC, 1997, chapter2). 
Figu re 8: Surplus and new weapon systems transferred 
Used weapons, still with military value, have become increasingly available. As a rule, surplus weapons 
are traded at lower-often bargain-prices or free-of-chargewithin military assistance programs. It is 
more common to carry out arms deals of  new equipment on a strictly commercial basis. The trade of 
surplus weapons has become a problematic aspect of  disarmament: if such weapons are not converted, 
scrapped or 'mothballed', they often end up in areas of  conflict. In certain cases, especially in the 
Aegean and the Middle East, the availabilityof surplus has fanned regional arms races. Among the 90 
countries importing surplus weapons, major recipients are Turkey, Greece, Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, but also countries such as Spain and the United States. 
Mainly as a result of  the growing amount of  surplus weapon stocks, the source of  supply has diversified. 
At least 41  different countries delivered second-hand major conventional weapons during the first half of 
the 1990s. Both the traditional weapon suppliers as well as others are now offering their surplus stocks 
on the market. Major suppliers of  surplus were the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, 
Belgium, the United Kingdom and France. 
Cost considerations(saving the costs of  storing or scrapping) have boosted the trend of  exporting 
surplus, even though the proceeds from such export have been lower than early government expectations 
suggested, mainly because the market is flooded with these type of  weapons. Although, as a rule, 
governments do not treat the transfer of  surplus weapons differently from that of  new ones, there seems 
to be a tendency to apply control regulations less restrictively for surplus, especially if no high-
technology is involved. 
A continued accumulation of  surplus in different parts of  the world can be expected. Assuming this 
continued generation of  easily available weapon stocks, what is needed is to strengthen the awareness of 
the fact that surplus is a potentially negative by-product of  disarmament. The lessons learned during the 
implementation of  the CFE Treaty and the Dayton Accords need to be applied to situations where 
surplus is generated to avoid the flow of  weapons into other areas of  conflict. What is needed, in 
addition, is a strengthening of national export control mechanisms as well as international policies to 
provide multilateral controls. 
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Figure 6: Share of  arms exports of  the major suppliers 
.\Iajor conventional weapons 
S'ources: SIPRI fearbonks 1996, p- -180 and /99--; p.  268 
Exporter  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
6 largest suppliers  88  87  86  88  90  89  88  89  85  83  90 
USA  27  28  30  28  34  49  56  52  56  43  45 
USSR/Russia  43  40  38  39  35  18  12  15  4  17  20 
FR Germany  3  2  3  3  5  10  6  7  II  9  6 
UK  4  5  3  7  5  4  4  5  7  7  8 
China  4  7  6  4  4  4  5  5  3  4  2 
France  9  6  6  7  7  4  5  6  4  4  9 
31 Figure 7:  Typology of  offsets in arms trade (sample of  offsets) 
Source: GAO 1996, SIPRI,  199~ 
Type of recipient  recipient  supplier  direct offsets  ndirect offsets 
(in the defense sector)  non~defense 
rade) 
Developed  Spain  Germany  coproduction of  200 Leopard main 
countries  battle tanks 
Canada  USA  establishment of  service center for 
C-130 aircraft for sale of  C-130 
UK  USA  large parts of  production of US 
Apache attack helicopters in UK 
Australia  Sweden  license production of 6 Type-47I 
submarines 
USA  Italy  license production of6 mine 
countermeasures ship 
Industrializing  Brazil  Gennany  license production of3 Type-
countries  209/1400 submarines 
Chile  Switzerland  license production of 120 Pirahnha 
armored personnel carriers 
China  Israel  license production of  air-ta-air 
missile Python-3 
China  Russia  delivery of  production technology 
for Su-27 fighter 
India  France  license production of  surveillance 
radar 
India  Netherlands  license production of  fire control 
radar 
India  South Korea  license production of  off-shore 
patrol vessel 
South  USA  development of  main battle tank K-
Korea  I ROKIT 
Malaysia  Russia  payment in palm oil 
or supply of  M  iG 29 
<;ghter aircraft 
Taiwan  France  ivil aircraft 
echnology supply as 
offset for US $3,5 
Taiwan  USA  repair contracts to establish regional  billion sale of Mirage 
aviation maintenance center:  Ighters 
obligation for  ISO F-16 fighters 
Less  Pakistan  China  license production of  Anza-2 
industrialized  surface-to-airm  issi Ie 
countries  Abu  France  stablishmentof 
Dhabi  ,annent factory, 
offset obligation for 
Saudi  USA  production of  components for tanks  upplyofmilitary 
Arabia  and aircraft; obligation for weapon  lectronics 
sales 
UAE  USA  stablishment of  an 
off-shore inveshnent 
und by Chase 
'vIan hattan as part of 
efense offset 
bligation 
32 Figure 8: Surplus and new weapon systems transferred, 1975-95 
Numher of  major weapons* 
Source: RIce 1997, p.  110,  hased on SIPRI data 
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* Included are (I) aircraft, (2) armored vehicles and tanks, (3) towed, self-propelled and naval artillery 
with a caliber of 100 mm or more, (4) ships with a standard displacement of 100 tons or more or anned 
with torpedoes, missiles andlor guns of  a caliber of 100 mm or more and (5) surveillance and fire control 
radar and guidance systems for missiles. 
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Appendix: Datafor Figures 
Datafi>r figure 1 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
-----_._---- ~ -- _._- - ----'''-- ---~.------- --------_. __  .- "  '  --------~-- ---_._---,---' 
Military expenditure  1015  1008  987  966  910  799  751  716  695  675 
Arms trade  44,2  38,1  37,4  30,9  26,5  24,8  26,4  21,8  23,2  23 
NATO equipmcntexp.  120,9  112,7  111,4  102,7  99,2  88,1  84,6  98,2  87,8  81,1 
Datafor  figure 2 
Saudi Arabia  8.583  China  5.870 
Turkey  7.433  Greece  5.426 
Egypt  7320  South Korea  5.117 
Taiwan  6.433  India  4.859 
Japan  6.233  Germany  4384 
Datafor  figure 3: 
----------._,---,--_.-._---------1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  J.993 _.1994_1995  _1996._ 
ACDA  72,9  64,5  55, I  39,3  31,4  32,2  26,7  31,9 
CRS··  66,6  52  52  36,3  40,2  39,7  32,8  29,4  31 
llSS  77, I  69,5  59,8  42,6  35,9  35,6  32,7  36,9  39,9 
SIPRI  44,7  43,8  36,3  31,1  29,2  31  25,6  27,2  27 
CRS'  75, I  53,3  48,5  32,8  29,2  28  25,5  29,2  29,1 
Datafor  figure 5: 
World military expenditures  World arms exports  Share of2 in  I, in % 
1985  971.0  52,9  5,4 
1986  10182  53,5  5,3 
1987  1050.8  63,7  6,1 
1988  10802  59,9  5,5 
1989  1089.0  53,8  4,9 
1990  1105.6  47,9  4,3 
1991  1048.8  35,6  3,4 
1992  973.8  29,2  3,0 
1993  9123  30,7  3,4 
1994  878.8  26, I  3,0 
1995  864.5  31,9  3,7 
Datafor  figure 8: 
1975  1980  1985  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
-------------".  ----,-------.  ""---_  ..  ._---------_.-
surplus  3302  3219  1170  1599  2268  2760  2871  5911  2637 
new  8689  11242  13768  6217  4299  5057  4800  4189  4523 
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